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gives no direction.1 2 The courts following this view recognize the hardship
of requiring a reapplication and a revival of a debt which was once considered
discharged. Futhermore, this view is consistent with the idea that the money
is the property of the contractor and he could have used it in payment of
other creditors unconnected with the assured contract.1 3 Thus, this view of
the law is consistent with idea of the negotiability of money and is com-
mercially desirable, inasmuch as the other views tend to place restrictions on
the use of the money used in making the payments.
The third view, which gives the surety no right to regulate the application
of the payments, seems to be the view which is gaining the most support.
It is not unfair to the surety, because he could refuse to assure a contractor
who was already heavily in dbt. Furthermore, the surety could provide in
the agreement just how the funds should be applied and could secure ample
protection in this way, since if such agreement were known to the creditor
he would have to respect it.14 Rt. E. M.
NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ANTI-INJUNCTION ACr-EXISTENCE OF A LABOR DIspUTr.-
Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, maintained several meat markets in Mil-
waukee, Wis., employing a total of some thirty persons, none of whom were
union members. Defendants, members of a labor union, after a fruitless
demand that plaintiff require its employees to become members of the union,
picketed plaintiff's place of business to force unionization. On a bill in the
Federal courts for an injunction, Held, a labor dispute existed within the
meaning of both the Federall and the state2 anti-injunction acts, and an injunc-
tion could not issue except in accordance with those acts.S
In surprisingly few words, 4 the Supreme Court has cast aside doubts as
to the constitutionality of the Norris-Laguardia Act-doubts that have persisted
during the six years that have elapsed since its adoption.5 In equally brief
fashion, the Court has laid down its first authoritative construction of the Act.
12 Western & Southern Indemnity Co. v. Cramer (1937), 10 N. E. (2d) 440;
(Ind. App. Court); Hirth v. Powers (1896), 108 Mich. 339, 66 N. W. 215;
Grace Harbor Lumber Co. v. Ortman (1916), 190 Mich. 429, 157 N. W. 96;
Radichel v. Federal Security Co. (1927), 170 Minn. 92, 212 N. W. 171;
Standard Oil v. Day (1924), 161 Minn. 281, 201 N. W. 410; City of Marshfield
v. United States Fidelity Co. (1929), 128 Ore. 547, 274 P. 503.
13Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Union State Bank (1927), 21 F. (2d) 102.
14 White v. Beem (1881), 80 Ind. 239.
147 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§101-115.
2 State statutes similar to the Federal Act have been adopted in Indiana
(Burns Ind. Stat. Ann., 1933, §§ 40-50iff), Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin. SEveral other states have restrictive statutes of
narrower scope.
3 Lauf et al v. E. G. Shinner & Co. (1938), - S. Ct. -.
4 The majority opinion found it necessary to cite only one authority for its
result, simply stating, "There can be no question of the power of Congress
thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United
States."
5 Recent indications had pointed to this result. The Supreme Court had
upheld the Wisconsin statute in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union (1937),
301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. '857. The lower Federal courts had consistently upheld
the Act, as had the majority of state courts in passing upon the validity of
their statutes. See, for example, Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin (CCA,
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Unfortunately, the interpretation of the statute can not be so easily resolved
as was its validity. The Act contains several phrases, the interpretation of
which can make the Act confer broad freedom on laborites or can make it
a practical nullity.6 The meaning of "labor dispute,"27 for example, is of
vital concern. The employment relation is the basis of the whole problem,
and yet the term "dispute" can not be limited by a simple definition of that
relation without undermining the purpose of the Act. The difficult cases and
the real problems arise where the employment relationship and the dispute
do not coincide-before employment has commenced, after employment has
terminated, and during employment when no dispute exists between employer
and employee.
There has been no case directly on the question of a labor dispute arising
before employment has begun. The disposition of the cases involving cessation
of employment indicate that it will be held that no dispute exists when one
who has never employed anyone is picketed to induce him to employ labor.8
Where, however, employment is contemplated, it seems possible that a dispute
could exist before the employment relation is formally commenced.
The effect of termination of the employment relation has confronted the
courts on several occasions. In two cases where the employer discharged all
of his men and did the entire work himself, courts have held that no labor
dispute could exist even though unions picketed to force the re-employment of
union men.9 These decisions seem sound. While it is unnecessary, according
2d, 1934.), 71 F. (2d) 284, cert. denied (1934), 293 U. S. 595; Cinderella
Theatre Corp. v. Sign Writers Local (E. D. Mich., 1934), 6 F. Supp. 164;
United Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice (CCA, 7th, 1935), 80 F. (2d) 1, cert. denied
(1936), 297 U. S. 714; Local Union No. 26 v. City of Kokomo (Ind., 1937),
5 N. E. (2d) 624; Schuster v. Int. Ass'n. of Machinists (II., 1938), 12 N. E.
(2d) 50; Dehan v. Hotel and Restaurant Employee etc. Union (La., 1935),
159 S. 637; Starr v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers Union (Ore., 1936),
63 P. (2d) 1104-; American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H. of A. (Wis.,
1936), 268 N. W. 250. Contra: Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co.
(1936), 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397.
6 The advocates of the Act were wqll aware of this possibility from the
fate of the anti-injunction section of the Clayton Act (29 U. S. C. § 52), hailed
at the time of its passage as a magna charta of the rights of -labor, but whose
supposed advantages vanished under a series of restrictive decisions. For an
excellent general discussion of this development, see Frankfurter and Greene,
The Labor Injunction, (1930). The new Act was carefully phrased to avoid
the doctrine of the restrictive decisions. (See infra, notes 14, 15.)
7The Act is confined to the issuance of an injunction in cases involving or
arising out of a labor dispute, and provides that: "The term labor dispute
includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employ-
ment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee." Further provisions describe what persons or groups
may become parties to labor disputes in broad terms. (29 U. S. C. § 113.)
8 Thompson v. Boekhout (1937), 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2nd) 674; Jensen
v. St. Paul M. P. 0. Union (1935), 194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811.
9 Thompson v. Boekhout (1937), 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2nd) 674; Jensen
v. St. Paul M. P. 0. Union (1935), 194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811. One other
case reached a similar result where members of the family aided with the
work. Luft v. Flove (1936) 270 N. Y. 640, 1 N. E. (2nd) 369. Where the
employer did only part of the work, and union men objected to this practice,
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to the provisions of the statute, that the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee, the very essence of the problems toward
which the Act was directed is an employment relation. Consequently, unless
each person alleged to be a party to a labor dispute falls within the general
classification of an employer or an employee, the Act should be held inappli-
cable.1o There is justification for holding that a temporary discontinuance of
business, especially if it resulted from a strike or lockout arising out of a
labor dispute, does not terminate the relation for purposes of the Act;11 to
rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Act.12 However, where there is
clear proof of a permanent cessation of business, it does not seem possible
that a dispute within the meaning of the Act could exist.1 3
Perhaps the most difficult problems to resolve are those involving situations
where an employment relation exists, but where there is no dispute between
the parties to the relation. The Act expressly provides that a dispute may
exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee."'14 In the teeth of this statutory language, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that no labor dispute
could exist between two labor unions where there was no immediate contro-
versy as to terms or conditions of employment.' 5 In disposing of the case
now under discussion, that same court held that no labor dispute existed where
outsiders picketed a place of business whose employees had no dispute with
their employer.16 Such decisions are strongly reminiscent of the judicial
treatment of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court, in reversing the last-
mentioned decision, has indicated that, like the majority of other courts which
have passed on the problem, it is willing to give the Act a broad construc-
tion.1 7 The situation is one of no little difficulty. The court is, in effect,
a labor dispute was held to exist in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union
(Wisc., 1936), 268 N. W. 270.
10 See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. (D. C., 1937), 92 F.
(2d) 510. There defendants were a racial group picketing to force employ-
ment of members of that race; it was held that no labor dispute existed.
11 Michaelson v. U. S. (1924), 266 U. S. 42, 45 S. Ct. 18.
12 Note that this result is accomplished in the National Labor Relations Act
by express definition. 49 Stat. 450, 29 U. S. C. § 152.
18 But see Diamond Hosiery Co. v. Leader et al (E. D. Pa., 1937), 20 F.
Supp. 467. There a dispute was found to exist after a factory had been sold
and partially dismantled. The soundness of the decision is questionable.
14 29 U. S. C. § 113. This provision of the Act was obviously intended to
prevent recurrence of a limiting formula adopted by Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering (1921), 254 U. S. 44-3, 41 S. Ct. 172, a leading case under the
Clayton Act.
15 United Electric Coals Co. v. Rice (CCA, 7th, 1935), 80 F. (2nd) 1,
cert. denied (1936), 297 U. S. 714. Contra: Cole v. Atlanta Terminal Co.
(N. D. Ga., 1936), 15 F. Supp. 131. Note, in contrast, the broad provision
of the Act (cited supra, note 7) which sought to circumvent the restrictive
interpretation placed by Vonnegut Mach. Co. v. Toledo Mach. & Tool Co.
(1920), 263 F. 192 on "A dispute concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment," the comparable Clayton Act provision.
16 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co. (CCA, 7th, 1936), 82 F. (2nd) 68.
17 Holding a labor dispute to exist: Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Painters
Local (E. D. Mich., 1934), 6 F. Supp. 164; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. Int. Ass'n.
of Mech. (Ore., 1936), 63 P. (2d) 1090; American Furniture Co. v. L B. of
T. C. & H. of A. (Wisc., 1936), 268 N. W. 250; Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v.
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asked in the name of protecting labor's freedom of organization to sanction
picketing which attempts to exert influence through an employer or other
workers who have exercised their own freedom of choice to reject the picket-
ing organization. The paradoxical conflict is even more accentuated when the
business is subject to the National Labor Relations Act,18 so that the employer
is forbidden by law to interfere with the organization of his men, and is
compelled to bargain exclusively with representatives of their majority.19
Nevertheless, the view adopted by the Supreme Court is preferable in that
it recognizes the opportunity to acquaint others with the contentions in a
peaceable manner without regard to the merits of those contentions.
Finally, there are some related problems to be decided after finding the
existence of a labor dispute. For example, do the limitations of the Act apply
when relief is sought by some party outside the dispute? Inasmuch as the Act
gives protection to the specific practices in furtherance of a dispute and is
expressly worded to include "any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute," relief should be denied even though an outsider suffers consequential
injuries.2 0 One step farther than this is the secondary boycott situation wherein
pressure is brought on outsiders in an effort to force the disputant to yield.2 1
The operation of the Act on these problems is unsettled.
D. M. C.
Furn. Workers Ind. Union (D. N. J., 1934), 8 F. Supp. 209; L. I. Coryell &
Son v. Petroleum Workers Union (D. Minn., 1936), 19 F. Supp. 749; Dean v.
Mayo (W. D. La., 1934), 8 F. Supp. 73; Shuster v. Int. Ass'n. of Machinists
(Il1., 1937), 12 N. E. (2d) 50. Holding a labor dispute not to exist: Lauf v.
E. G. Shinner & Co. (CCA, 7th, 1936), 82 F. (2nd) 68; Donnelly Garment
Co. v. Int. Fed. Garment Workers Union (1937), 21 F. Supp. 807; Safeway
Stores v. Retail Clerks Union (1935), 184 Wash. 322; 51 P. (2nd) 372; Feller
v. Local Union No. 144 (N. J., 1937), 191 A. 111 (statute somewhat different) ;
Culinary Workers Union v. Fuller (Tex., 1937), 105 S. W. (2nd) 295 (statute
also different).
18 49 Stat. 450, 29 U. S. C. § 152. Note that the two Acts are overlapping
rather than concurrent in scope. The Wagner Act applies to businesses affect-
ing interstate commerce; the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to all actions in
the Federal courts.
19 In three cases, the policy of the Wagner Act has been argued as a
modification of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in making unlawful any picketing
which sought to oppose the organization desires of the majority of the em-
ployees. Two decisions (by the same judge) turned down that argument;
Grace v. Williams (W. D. Mo., 1937), 20 F. Supp. 263; Cupples Co. v. A. F.
of L. (E. D. Mo., 1937), 20 F. Supp; 894. The third case reached the
opposite result: Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers (W. D. Mo.,
S. D., 1937), 21 F. Supp. 20.
20Assuming that those injuries would support an action in the absence
of statute.
21The majority of courts have held, in the absence of, statute, that a
secondary boycott was unlawful both as to the person picketed and as to the
other disputant. The working of the statute is broad enough to cover secondary
boycotts, but the great aversion of the courts to this practice may prevent such
a construction. The New York courts have held that under the comparable
New York statute neither the disputant nor the outsider who was picketed
could get relief so long as the picketing was primarily directed toward the
disputant even though the outsider's place of business was used as the locale;
but where the pressure was primarily upon the outsider, even though in an
attempt to strengthen the fight against the disputant, it was coercive and
unlawful. Goldfinger v. Feintuch (1937), 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2nd) 910;
